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TURNING AWAY FROM LAW?t
David M. Trubek*
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOLUME I: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE; VOLUME 2: COMPARATIVE STUDIES. Edited by Richard L. Abel. New York: Academic Press. 1982. $29.50 per volume.
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? By Jerold S. Auerbach. New York: Oxford University Press. 1983. Pp. xv, 182. Cloth, $16.95; paper,
$6.95.
We live in a strange time. High priests of our legal order are
questioning the law. At ritual events and in official publications the
legal elite has stopped celebrating the law and encouraging its use,
and has begun to chastise the public for relying on the law and to
condemn lawyers who encourage such popular vices. Where chief
justices, law school deans and similar types once celebrated the Rule
of Law as the core of American civilization and advocated the expansion of legal rights and legal services, some now rail against the
evils of "legal pollution" and warn of the threat of a "litigation
explosion."
The picture that is painted is of a people in moral decline. In
tones reminiscent of revival meetings, these high priests associate
law with images of evil and its use with weakness and decadence. A
former law school dean and president of the Legal Services Corporation calls up the foul image of "legal pollution . . . clogging the
everyday affairs of all of us." 1 The Chief Justice of the United States
chastises Americans for "increasingly turning to the courts for relief
from a range of personal distresses and anxieties." 2
The nation, we are told, is threatened by the disease of
hyperlexis and the litigation explosion it engenders. In a recent article, Mark Cannon, assistant to our Chief Justice, tells us that because
Americans react to virtually any problem by bringing a lawsuit, we
are in the grip of an unprecedented litigation explosion that is straining our courts, eroding self-government, weakening representative
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institutions, and sapping the economy. 3 Litigation is evidence of the
decline of virtue: "[T]he epidemic of litigation," Cannon thunders,
"reflects weakness in American society."4 Noting that litigation
rates are much lower in Japan than in the United States, he suggests
that our greater litigiousness may explain why Japan's per capita income has caught up with ours in the last twenty-five years. 5 "The
legal explosion," he says, "saps the strength of our economy."6 If we
weren't spending all that time suing, Cannon hints, we would have
designed better cars and television sets.
Those who preach against the evils of litigation and the temptations of too much law have a cure in mind. We have sinned, but
redemption is at hand. Surely, in the heavenly city there will be less
conflict: the priests suggest that all will be better when the populace
is more self-reliant, lawyers less greedy, and judges more restrained.
But they do not want to ban all conflict; they also want to channel
conflict out of the courts and into "informal" institutions. Through
the greater use of arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and neighborhood justice centers we will find what is needed to restore lost republican virtues and even revive flagging industries.7
These people are not simply telling us to shape up and stop using
the law so much; some are suggesting we employ institutions that
might be seen as the antithesis of law. Dispute processing institutions are informal, Richard Abel tells us,
to the extent that they are nonbureaucratic in structure and relatively
undifferentiated from the larger society, minimize the use of professionals, and eschew official law in favor of substantive and procedural
norms that are vague, unwritten, commonsensical, flexible, ad hoc, and
particularistic. [Vol.1, p. 2].
So described, informal justice seems to be the negation of the idea of
the rule oflaw. Roberto Unger has identified four attributes that are
essential to what he calls a "legal order": for the rule of law to exist
law must emanate from the state, be explicit, be applied by independent and autonomous decisionmakers, and apply generally to
all persons similarly situated. 8 Are the current apostles of informal
justice advocating the abandonment of law in this sense? Are people
who spend their lives litigating or adjudicating (or teaching others to
do so) losing faith in the law and urging people to seek other solutions? Just as the people are (supposedly) flocking to the courts in
3. Cannon, Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Needfar Alternatives, 63 NATL. FoFall 1983, at 10.
4. Id at 12.
5. Id at 11.
6. Id
7. Burger, supra note 2, at 276-77; Cannon, supra note 3, at 12.
8. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 47-127 (1976).
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droves, they are told: do not enter these dark and dismal halls; take
your cares elsewhere.
·This seems like a paradox. Shouldn't lawyers be proud of the
formal processes that underlie our concept of the rule of law and
thus the liberal vision of politics and society? Informalism could be
seen as a threat to the idea of law itself. If law cannot be separated
from community norms or immediate purposes and thus stand beyond politics, if norms are not applied by any specialized decisionmakers enjoying some measure of autonomy, how can rights be
preserved? If there are no ways to restrict bias in judgments by insisting on detachment, and limiting what may be heard at trial, if no
standards exist by which judgments can be reviewed and discretion
curbed, what then remains of the liberal concept of law? Yet if informalism is so much at odds with our common notions of legal order, why are some who claim to speak for the legal profession and
the judiciary so eager to tum away from formal justice and so ready
to adopt dispute processing techniques that rely little, if at all, on the
application of pre-existing rules, use lay rather than professional
decisionmakers, seek accommodation rather than the definition and
enforcement of rights, and arguably provide less protection against
bias and discretion?
One way to resolve this apparent paradox is to view the interest
in informalism not as a preference for this approach, but as the reluctant acceptance of a second-best solution. Imagine that these lawyers, wedded to the formal system, but concerned about an
impending litigation catastrophe, decided that triage was essential
and that the less desirable but cheaper solution of informalism had
to be adopted -in the crisis. This account would resolve the paradox
but it is not an accurate picture of what happened. The preference
for informalism and the push for "alternatives" to litigaton did not
emerge after careful study of existing litigation practices or the
thoughtful weighing of any evidence of a catastrophe. The diagnosis
and the cure emerged at the same time. Indeed, one could argue that
the purported litigation crisis was invented to justify the solution of
informalism, rather than the other way around.
The case that things are so bad that we must settle for secondrate justice has never really been proven. Marc Galanter has conducted a meticulous analysis of the literature that predicts disaster if
litigation trends continue, a field he calls "hyperlexology." 9 He
shows that the claims made in this literature rest on scant evidence.
Frequently-made statements about the propensity of Americans to
litigate and allegations that we are the world's most litigious society
9. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of .Disputes: What We Know and .Don't Know (And
Think We Kow) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 7
(1983).
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were based on scant data. 1° Claims that litigation rates are soaring
and have reached unprecedented levels rely on selected statistics and
projections of short-run trends. 11 Further, one can dispute such
claims by taking account of more of the available evidence. For example, my colleagues in the Civil Litigation Research Project and I
have shown that only a small percent of the disputes Americans engage in become lawsuits, that most of our lawsuits are settled, and
that most cases are modest in scope. 12 Galanter's data suggest that
our litigation rates are neither higher than those in other industrial
countries nor higher than they have been at other times in our past. 13
Little evidence has yet been offered to support the view that, like
it or not, we must tum away from law to stem the flood of lawsuits.
But that is not really the point. For the advocates of informalism do
not just offer "alternative" dispute processing institutions as a second-best solution. Quite the contrary: the literature is replete with
statements that informal justice is preferable. Such processes are
pictured as fairer and more accessible, as well as quicker and
cheaper than the courts. 14 The advocates of informalism do not
think they are promoting an inferior brand of justice.
So the paradox remains. The elite lawyers' interest in informal,
non-legal dispute processing is not a thoughtful, tragic response dictated by a well-understood and irrefutable catastrophe. The tum to
alternatives, at least in the ritual rhetoric of many elite spokesmen,
must be something more - or less - than that. To understand this
tum of events we must look beneath the surface. That is what the
two books under review help us to do. Both Jerome Auerbach, a
historian and critic of the legal profession, and Richard Abel, a lawyer and sociologist of law, take the current passion for informal dispute processing as a puzzle to be unraveled, and seek to place the
discussion in historical, comparative, and theoretical contexts.
These books help us to understand current paradoxes in elite
rhetoric because they relate ideas about the administration of justice
to broader visions of society and the political movements they reflect
or engender. Both authors are concerned with the roots of informalism. They recognize that ideas about resolving disputes involve
more than technical questions of judicial management. Both want
not only to describe the emergence of the views that mediation is
preferable to adjudication, that community norms are better than of10. Id at 10-11.
11. Id at 37.
12. Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983) (summarizing the findings of a national survey which explored the
use and non-use of courts, the costs of civil litigation, and related matters).
13. Galanter, supra note 9, at 36-60.
14. E.g., Burger, supra note 2, at 277; Cannon, supra note 3, at 13.
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ficial law, or that face-to-face interaction is superior to the cold and
distant routine of the courts: they also seek to explain why such
views are expressed and sometimes take hold.
Although they share an interest in the roots of informalism, these
authors approach the question in different ways and evaluate phenomena differently. Auerbach is deeply attracted to informal justice
because it is the expression of a communitarian vision of society he
favors and a rejection of a competitive individualism he decries.
Deeply skeptical of American liberalism and the legalism that it engenders, Auerbach seeks to show that throughout our history there
have been groups whose alternative vision of society led them to seek
'justice without law'': to define norms and settle conflict through
community interaction and face-to-face mediation rather than by
adversarial conflict and detached adjudication. He sees the legal
profession as the principal obstacle to successful realization of this
ideal of justice without law.
Abel shares Auerbach's distrust of lawyers and some of his enthusiasm for true community and informal processes of dispute resolution. Abel, however, sees the primary obstacle . to genuine
informalism not in the professional interests of the bar, but in the
needs of a capitalist economy and the operation of the capitalist
state. Moreover, Abel's focus is extremely broad. While Auerbach is
content to survey debates about modes of dispute processing
throughout American history, Abel goes even further in his search
for the roots of informalism. Assembling essays by numerous authors in two large volumes, Abel offers us a survey that covers many
cultures and ~es. The two volumes of The Politics ofInformal Justice include general theoretical essays and specific empirical and historical studies. The quality is mixed, but they form an impressive
whole. Abel includes studies that confirm Auerbach's claim that dissenting movements in America like the Knights of Labor have found
the idea of informal justice attractive. But The Politics of Informal
Justice also examines the importance of informal justice in the political programs of movements and regimes as disparate as the Nazis in
Germany, traditional modernizers in pre-World War II Japan, and
socialists in Allende's Chile, Communist China, contemporary Portugal and post-colonial Mozambique. These volumes show that the
rhetoric of informal justice has been used by modernizing elites
seeking to preserve some of the hierarchical structure of traditional
society during industrialization, and by radical socialists whose apparent goal is a decentralized and egalitarian society.
The authors in these books are not promoting the use of alternative dispute processing in the United States today. Auerbach doesn't
think that experiments in arbitration, mediation, and neighborhood
justice currently supported by our legal elite will do much good;
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Abel and some of his colleagues think they could do great harm.
Neither book tells us in detail how alternative techniques work or
how alternative institutions actually function. One would not consult these books to learn how to be a mediator or set up a neighborhood justice center. Indeed, they contain relatively little information
on actual projects and procedures. The focus is not on how to do it
or on who is doing it, but on why everyone seems to be talking about
it and what that means.
These books raise important questions about the role of images
and institutions of justice in American life. Auerbach sees a permanent tension between formal and informal conceptions of justice and
explores oscillations between them throughout our history. Abel
asks whether the move to informalism presages a major turning
point in the American legal system: even his comparative studies
seem to be designed to shed light on that question. 15 Both see that
the move towards mediation, arbitration, and the neighborhood justice centers is a move away from courts and the ideal of formal justice. They are as interested in explaining why we might be moving
away from our core legal institutions as in knowing what we are
moving towards. They seek to give an account of the apparent turning away from law as a central source of justice in America.
To do that, one must have a theory about relationships between
cultural ideals, political movements, and legal institutions. These
volumes suggest not one theory but several. The authors Abel has
assembled do not share a common perspective. Several participated
in a Conference on Critical Legal Studies panel which gave birth to
this book, and most share a general left-wing orientation, but their
work is otherwise quite diverse. Auerbach shares Abel's skepticism
about some of the current rage for alternatives but not his analytic
framework, which draws heavily on the Marxist tradition. Read together, these volumes do not offer a single explanation for the paradox I have alluded to - or any other questions that arise when we
consider the contradictory nature of the discourse on informalism in
America today. Rather, the books provide a series of theoretical
starting points, interpretative approaches, and concrete hypotheses.
Since the perspectives set forth are rich and the historical and sociological analyses quite provocative, these books will be of use to
scholars of law in society long after the ill-starred and misnamed
"neighborhood justice center" (which wasn't in a neighborhood and
dispensed relatively little justice) is thankfully forgotten.
If we look for a way to explain the turning away from law I have
15. Abel sets forth his goals in the Introduction to Volume 1. He asks if recent "tirades
against the expansion of . . . rights, . . . professional legal services, and . . . formal legal
institutions" presage a major transformation of our legal system, or are just a lot of talk. The
goal of the two volumes is to explore that question. Vol 1, pp. 1-2.
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described, if we think of these books as aids in the interpretation of a
discourse in which some elite spokesmen for the American legal profession decry the overuse of law and call for non-legal solutions to
conflicts and problems, what do we find? Naturally, in a collection
this heterogeneous there are numerous competing and even conflicting explanations. However, at the end of Volume 1 of The Politics of
Informal Justice Abel includes an excellent essay of his own on "The
Contradictions of Informal Justice" (vol. 1, pp. 267-320) which
serves as a summary of the major themes explored. This, read along
with Auerbach's thesis, helps us identify several core ideas. While
these are tentative and overlapping, there are five accounts of the
"turning away from law" that strike me as especially fruitful. They
suggest it could be:
(i) a tactic designed to accomplish a concrete set of political goals;
(ii) a defensive move by the legal profession to co-opt and control
popular movements which threaten the profession's economic
interests;
(iii) a response to the need to legitimate the legal system by offering
new ideals that hold out new promises of fairness after others
have been exposed as shams;
(iv) an effort to create an atmosphere in which the role of law in
America could be altered; and
(v) a way to introduce a new form of social control that is more pervasive and powerful than formal law.

If we wish to probe the motives behind the move toward informalism, the tactical explanation is the most obvious. There are
concrete situations in which people may think that handling certain
kinds of disputes in informal settings will lead to different results
than would be had in the courts. In these situations the rhetoric
about the general virtues of informalism may simply mask an effort
to favor X over Y. The Abel volumes include several examples of
this rather focused, tactical use of informalism. One of the most interesting is Mark Lazerson's account of the introduction of an informal Housing Court to handle landlord-tenant cases in the Bronx
(vol. 1, pp. 119-63). Lazerson shows that this effort was, at least in
part, motivated by desires to weaken tenant groups who, with aid
from legal services lawyers, had successfully used the regular courts
and formal law to secure a better bargaining position vis-a-vis
slumlords. Another is John Haley's intriguing story of the decision
by the Japanese during the inter-war period to introduce mandatory
conciliation in landlord-tenant, family and similar disputes (vol. 2,
pp. 125-47). Haley shows that the Japanese elite pushed for conciliation as an alternative to litigation because of rather concrete political
goals: they feared the impact of litigation under the new civil code
on the traditional structure of Japanese life and wanted to ensure
that the political inroads on family and local authority which litiga-
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tion could engender would be curbed. In both cases a rhetoric that
stressed the general virtues of informal over formal dispute settlement actually justified changes designed to benefit a specific group.
A second explanation for the newfound interest in informalism is
that lawyers may be trying to control a movement that threatens
their professional interests. Auerbach tells us that at an earlier stage
in our history lawyers felt threatened by business and popular dissatisfaction with the legal system, a dissatisfaction that included pressure to set up dispute processing systems that did not use lawyers at
all. One among many fascinating stories he tells is that of the "legalization" of commercial arbitration, in which the legal profession
managed to take control of and shape a movement for commercial
arbitration that had started as an effort to create truly informal, nonlegal dispute processing institutions and ended up constructing a
parallel system of relatively formal justice dominated by lawyers and
employing many elements of the adversarial process and the judicial
method (pp. 96-97, 101). Certainly to some degree similar concerns
animate current calls for informalism emanating from the legal elite.
Aren't law schools taking an interest in divorce mediation, for example, because they fear students will not be equipped to compete with
non-legal professionals trained in non-adversarial techniques? Such
concerns play some role in the current scene, but it is interesting that
none of these authors identify any strong or broad-based pressures
for informal justice that might be forcing lawyers to try to preempt
the rhetoric and practice of alternatives. Indeed, Auerbach calls the
most recent period ''The Legalization of Community" (p. 115), suggesting that the images of "community'' associated with informal
justice are being used primarily by lawyers who have taken the lead
in the current movement. The only "grass-roots" pressures he finds
in recent years are the efforts of some reformers to use informal dispute processing as part of a "community empowerment" strategy
(pp. 116-17). But these efforts, which after all were initiated by elite
lawyers like Jean and Edgar Cahn, came to very little. As Paul
W ahrhaftig points out in his contribution to the Abel book (vol. 1,
pp. 75-97), few of the recent American alternative dispute processing
experiments were really organized around viable communities, fewer
were oriented to community empowerment, and most that were did
not succeed. Although efforts at co-option and preemption may play
a role in the story, they seem less important than other factors.
The authors suggest that the discourse on informalism may serve
ideological functions as well as protect concrete interests. Because
they show how images of dispute processing play a role in diverse
political ideologies, these books draw our attention to the ideological
dimension of discourse on the administration of justice. Is there an
ideological function behind the new interest in informal and nonadversarial modes of dispute processing? Abel and Auerbach think
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so. Both suggest that the turning point away from law may be a
response to legitimation needs. Informalism may distract attention
away from the flaws of the legal system while reducing potential
threats to social stability that could result from our taking law too
seriously.
•Legitimation is a central theme of Auerbach's book and a major
topic of the analysis offered by several authors in the Abel collection.16 The central argument (when applied to the United States) is
that in practice American law must always disappoint those to whom
it offers a promise of freedom, equality, and justice. For Auerbach,
the struggle to legitimate American society through law is "Sisyphian" (p. 146), for an ideology that relies on legalism seeks to reconcile
the irreconcilable. While law promises freedom, equality, and neutrality, our legal system is embedded in a society that denies effective
liberty to many, encourages inequality, and subverts any genuine effort to construct a system of control outside the structures of power
and hierarchy that we all live in. In this analysis, since the promise
of American law must always exceed its performance, the legal elite
is constantly struggling to find ways to cover over flaws or generate
new utopias to preserve the illusion that these flaws will be resolved
in short order. 17 Informalism, in this sense, is just the latest answer to
the perennial problem of justifying a system that denies its own
ideals. Proposals for informalism make it easier for the elite to forestall the widespread criticism that American law is inaccessible, that
high costs ration law and favor haves over have-nots, and that the
law offers no solution to many of the most immediate problems of
daily life. By promising the institution of some new solution to these
age-old problems, in the form of arbitration, mediation, neighborhood justice centers, and the like, lawyers can preserve the legitimacy of the legal system, itself a central part of our national creed.
This analysis could explain why we have turned to informalism
as a new solution and at the same time done so little to implement it.
For it is important to recognize that despite all the talk about alternatives, very little has been done to create any. The Dispute Resolution Act, which was supposed to put federal money behind the
movement for alternatives, was never funded. 18 The neighborhood
justice center program has been abandoned by the federal govern16. See e.g., Abel (vol. l, pp. 267-320), Santos (vol. l, pp. 249-66), and Reifner (vol. 2, pp.
81-123).
17. For further discussion of these aspects of American legal ideology, see Trubek, Com•
plexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Ba/bus and the Challenge of Critical Social
Thought About Law, l l LAW & Socv. REV. 529-69 (1977); Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. - (1983) (forthcoming).
18. The Dispute Resolution Act of Feb. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-190, § 2 (b), 94 Stat. 17
(1981), was passed ''to assist the States and other interested parties in providing to all persons
convenient access to dispute resolution mechanisms which are effective, fair, inexpensive and
expeditious." Auerbach notes that while Congress approved the bill, and it was signed into
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ment. Foundation interest has waned. As the rhetoric of informalism grows in intensity, less is done to tum the rhetoric into reality.
The nature of the rhetoric, however, provides an additional clue
that may help us solve our original puzzle. Even if we accept the
legitimacy theory which I have distilled from Auerbach and Abel,
we are led to ask: why this form of legitimation? Even if we accept
the view that American legal thought must contain a utopian element that resolves the contradiction between the law's promise of
escape from inequality and domination and the reality that the law is
just part of an unjust and hierarchical system, we are still led to ask
why informalism has become our new utopia. For if there has been
any real change in the last ten years, it is not in the organization and
structure of the legal system but in the utopian images that the legal
elite employs. Ten years ago our elites had an answer to the "unfulfilled promise of American law," but it was the answer of more law,
not less. Ten years ago those who participated in the high rituals of
the legal order - honorary lectures, commencement addresses, and
the like - often used these events as opportunities to call for the
extension of rights, expansion oflegal services, creation of public interest law, and improved "access to justice." Why is it that today
these images are thrown aside and we are told of the delights of informalism, the wonders of the indwelling community, the promise of
mediation?
These volumes offer several possible answers to this question, all
of them chilling. One is that our elites have recognized that the
promise of more law is too dangerous: when we promised to overcome dissatisfaction with the legal system by improving representation for the have-nots and strengthening their rights, these promises
actually made a difference. Cases were brought and rights never
before taken seriously had to be respected. These changes challenged
powerful groups who look to the law to protect their interests, not to
limit their power. If the vice of perfected legalism as a utopia is that
it might be taken seriously, then the solution is to offer a new utopia,
an alternative vision of society and conflict resolution that downgrades the idea of rights, undercuts the rationale for extending legal
services to the poor and unorganized groups, yet at the same time
strengthens traditional bonds and authorities and discourages the
sort of conflict that might lead to substantive justice. Is that what
underlies the current passion for informal justice?
A second suggestion is equally disturbing. The idea that informalism is a way in which the state expands its power, while cloaking it in the garb of "community," forms a leitmot!f in the Abel
volumes. Abel and several others suggest that while informalism aplaw by President Carter, no funds have been appropriated under it and the Act remains a dead
letter. Pp. 136-37.
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pears to be a way to return power to neighborhoods, communities
and private organizations, it really serves to facilitate expanded state
intervention in our lives.
In his essay on "The Contradictions of Informal Justice" (vol. 1,
pp. 267-320), Abel speculates on what might come about if the move
toward informal justice were successful. Today, he suggests, we
have a situation in which social control is exerted partly by private
structures with some relationship to genuine communities, and
partly by state institutions which are circumscribed by formal law.
The growth of informal justice, he argues, threatens both to weaken
genuine forms of community and to undermine the protections
granted by the form.al system.
While the apostles of informalism routinely invoke the rhetoric
of a "natural" community (which is contrasted with the artifice of
law), and suggest that alternative forms of dispute processing are a
way to return justice to the community, Abel's study shows that the
projects which implement this idea actually depend on state resources and state personnel. Neighborhood justice centers, for example, were primarily funded by government grants and associated
with courts, not neighborhoods. As Christine Harrington points out
(vol. I, pp. 35-71), most centers depend on referrals from courts and
prosecutors for their case load. So, Abel suggests, the proponents of
informalism don't actually want to strengthen real communities:
rather they will substitute new forms of state control which lack both
the spontaneity of civil society and the minimal protections of formal
law. Since alternative institutions are supported, directly or indirectly, by the state they will supersede any "genuine" community
structures that do exist. Since alternative institutions are pictured as
non-coercive (despite the fact that they often need coercion to work)
they can dispense with the sort of due process protections which are
built into our formal system.
The critics tell us not to believe in the chimera of justice without
law. But they also tell us they do not believe in justice through law.
We seem to be left with no way out. Auerbach and Abel denounce
legal formalism almost as vigorously as they condemn informalism.
Auerbach's book contains a strong polemic against liberal legalism
and the legal profession, as well as a passionate condemnation of the
sort of society and culture which makes formal law seem either necessary or desirable. But he recognizes that we live in just such a
society. Since he believes that any alternative vision of justice will
be a delusion unless the society itself is changed - a possibility that
he seems to discount -Auerbach counsels us to reject the tum away
from law. The book ends on a note of stoic resignation: legal formalism, however hollow and terrifying, is still all we have to cling to.
The values of informal justice and the vision of community they em-

February 1984]

Turning Away From Law?

835

body, he suggests, are the ones we should espouse, but anyone who
thinks they can be realized in America today is a chump, and anyone
who proposes trying to do so must be trying to fool us.
In a sense, Abel's volumes strike the same stoic note. It is true
that Abel himself clearly relates both the flaws of formalism and the
pitfalls of informalism to the operation of the capitalist system, thus
implying that transformation of the system may be a way out. Moreover, some of his collaborators emphatically embrace socialism and
point to socialist experiments in informalism as exemplars. Thus
Abel, more than Auerbach, points us toward a transformative politics. But the nature of this struggle is unclear. While Abel and his
colleagues survey a wide range of experiences and demonstrate some
enthusiasm for popular justice in other times and other places, one
gets the feeling that the closer they get to our reality, the more
trouble they have deriving political lessons or an affirmative vision
from their analysis. As a result, they can only condemn the dangers
of false informalism and are, like Auerbach, forced to hold onto legal formalism, however diminished and hollow it may be.
So the ultimate paradox in this story is that no one really seems
to believe in law anymore. The elites who champion alternatives
question the law's efficacy, but so do the critics. Auerbach sees legalism as the antithesis of community and humane values; Abel and his
colleagues see formal law as at best a weak reed that the poor can
occasionally hold onto and at worst the very heart of oppression.
The high priests celebrate an informalism they don't believe in,
while the critics reluctantly champion a formalism they distrust.

